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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33
(D.C. Cir. 2005)
CASE SUMMARY
Larissa Eusticet
This case involves a challenge to the legality of the United States mili-
tary commissions convened to try alien combatants detained in the course
of the war on terror. Salim Ahmed Hamdan's petition is the first to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of such commissions since World War 11.1
Hamdan was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan and detained as an
enemy combatant. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging,
among other things, his pretrial detention at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base
and the validity of trial by military commission. The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia heard and granted Hamdan's petition
on November 8, 2004, finding that the military commission violated the
laws and treaties of the United States. 2 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the judgment and
upheld the legality of the military commissions.3
The United States has been waging a war against terrorism since Sep-
tember 11, 2001. 4 In response to the devastation caused by the al Qaeda
attacks, Congress enacted the Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) which granted the President the use of "all necessary and appro-
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1. Petition for Hearing En Banc at 6, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (No. 04-5393) (noting that the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) and Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), altered the
legal landscape and defined the roles of the judiciary and the executive in trying military
offenses). In both Quirin and Eisentrager the Supreme Court denied the alien enemy
detainee petitions for habeas relief and firmly established the power of the executive to
create and administer military tribunals for the purpose of trying enemy combatants.
Note that all briefs related to this case are available at http://www.hamdanvrum-
sfeld.com/briefs (last visited Mar. 3, 2006).
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004),
rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted mem., 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) (No. 05-
184). Prior or subsequent history is omitted hereinafter.
3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan II), 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
4. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/
09/print/20010920-8.html.
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priate force"'5 against any person or organization suspected of terrorism.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush, acting pursuant to his Com-
mander-in-Chief power, the AUMF, 10 U.S.C. §§ 8216 and 836, 7 and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 8 issued a Military Order con-
cerning the "Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism" 9 empowering military commissions to hear war
crimes charges brought against those suspected of participating in or aid-
ing al Qaeda. 10
Under the AUMF, the United States commenced an armed conflict
against Afghanistan to subdue the al Qaeda network and supporting
Taliban regime." In the course of these ongoing operations, numerous
persons have been detained. In late November 2001, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen, was captured by Afghani militia forces as he
5. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) [hereinafter AUMF]. The AUMF, approved by Congress on September 18, 2001,
states that "the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ...."
6. 10 U.S.C.A. § 821 (2005) provides that the jurisdiction of courts-martial are not
exclusive and "do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute
or by the law of war may be tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals."
7. 10 U.S.C.A. § 836 (2005) provides that the President may provide applicable
rules governing courts-martial: "(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including
modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military
commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be
prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practica-
ble, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial
of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to
or inconsistent with this chapter."
8. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is the bedrock of military law and
was enacted by Congress in 1950 in response to a demand for a uniform system of
courts-martial for the military services. The UCMJ superseded the "Articles of War" and
imposed strict rules of conduct and responsibility on military servicemen and women.
Most importantly, it provided a set procedure to prosecute and try military offenders
through federally regulated courts-martial. See generally Uniform Code of Military Jus-
tice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Mili-
taryLaw/UCMJ-1950.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter UCMJ].
9. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/11/print/20011113-27.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter "Military Order" or "November 13, 2001 Military Order"]. The Military Order states
that any person subject to the order, including members of al Qaeda, shall, "when tried,
be tried by [a] military commission for any and all offenses triable by [a] military com-
mission that such individual is alleged to have committed ...." Id. § 4.
10. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation and Allied Educational Foundation as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents-Appellants at 2, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415
F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393).
11. Notice of Motion and Respondents' Cross-Motion to Dismiss at 5, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. C04-0777RSL) (originally filed with
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on August 6,
2004, before the case was transferred to the District of Columbia); see also Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 1, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2005).
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attempted to flee Afghanistan with his family. 12 After transfer to American
military custody, Hamdan was eventually taken to Guantanamo Naval Base
and placed in the general detainee population at Camp Delta.'
3
On July 3, 2003, President Bush found that "there is reason to believe
that [Hamdan] was a member of al Qaeda or was otherwise involved in
terrorism directed against the United States."'1 4 This finding made
Hamdan subject to trial by military commission as prescribed in the Presi-
dent's November 13, 2001 Military Order.' 5
In December 2003, Hamdan was transferred from the general detainee
population to solitary confinement at Camp Echo.1 6 On December 18,
2003, Lieutenant Charles Swift was appointed to serve as. Hamdan's coun-
sel, initially for the restricted purpose of a plea negotiation.' 7 However, on
February 12, 2004, Lieutenant Swift filed a demand for charges and speedy
trial rights as provided under the UCMJ. 18 Hamdan's demand was rejected
on February 23 due to the finding that the UCMJ did not apply to his
detention.' 9 On April 6, petitioned for mandamus or, alternately, habeas
corpus, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.
20
12. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan II), 415 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 2. Charles Swift, Hamdan's military
counsel, revealed in an exclusive interview with The Miami Herald that at the time of his
capture, Hamdan was alone and driving a borrowed car in a mountainous region of
Afghanistan, after just evacuating his daughter and pregnant wife in the safety of Paki-
stan. According to Swift, Hamdan was returning the borrowed car when he was cap-
tured by Afghani forces. Carol Rosenberg, Driver for bin Laden in a Guantanamo Cell,
Mimit HERALD, Feb. 11, 2004, at LA, reprinted in Declaration of Lieutenant Commander
Charles Swift at 55-56 (Ex. G), Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (No. CV04-0777).
13. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 2.
14. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 35. Relying on the authority granted him by the AUMF,
President Bush determined that al Qaeda is a nation that "planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001," and as a result
authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and its operatives. In coordination with the
November 13, 2001 Military Order authorizing the establishment of military commis-
sions to hear war crimes charges, the President determined that Hamdan was subject to
trial pursuant to this order, based on his determination that Hamdan was a member of
al Qaeda or was otherwise involved in terrorism against the United States. Brief of
Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 10, at 2-4.
15. Hamdan 11, 415 F.3d at 35.
16. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 2 (noting that
Hamdan was kept in solitary confinement for eight months and was released only four
days before the start of the district court hearing).
17. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 35; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152, 155 (D.D.C. 2004).
18. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 155. The Military Order authorizes the Secretary
of Defense to designate an "Appointing Authority" to issue orders regulating the military
commissions. Lieutenant Swift filed the speedy trial demand with the Appointing
Authority, John D. Altenburg. Id.
19. Id. Rejection of Hamdan's demand was premised on the President's finding that
Hamdan was triable by the military commissions and was not entitled to trial by the
regularly constituted courts-martial or military tribunals. Brief of Washington Legal
Foundation, supra note 10, at 3.
20. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 155. Lieutenant Charles Swift is legally domiciled
in the Western District of Washington and thus argued that he was entitled to seek relief
in Washington as Hamdan's "next friend." The government challenged Swift's standing
as "next friend," and on September 14, 2004, the petition was amended to be in
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In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul v. Bush and the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Gherebi v. Bush, the case was transferred to the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in August 2004.21
In July 2004, while his habeas petition was pending before the District
Court in Washington, and approximately thirty-two months after the
inception of his detention, the government formally charged Hamdan with
conspiracy to commit attacks on civilians, murder by an unprivileged bel-
ligerent, and terrorism. 2 2 The charges against Hamdan arose from his
position as Osama bin Laden's personal driver in Afghanistan between
1996 and November 2001, a post Hamdan admitted holding.2 3 The
charges also asserted that Hamdan served as bin Laden's personal body-
guard and delivered weapons and ammunition to al Qaeda members. 24
Hamdan adamantly insists that he is a civilian, has never been a member of
al Qaeda, is not a terrorist, and committed no crimes. 25
Hamdan's habeas petition consists of eight counts and alleges the
denial of Hamdan's speedy trial rights as provided by UCMJ (count 1);
challenges his pretrial detention as violative of the Geneva Convention Rel-
ative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("Third Geneva Convention" or
"Convention") as a whole (count 2), and article 3 particularly (count 3);26
Hamdan's name only. Id. at 156; see also Petition for Writ of Mandamus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1361 or, in the Alternative, Writ of Habeas Corpus at 2-3, Hamdan 1, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 153 (No. CV04-0777L) (brief filed with the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington on April 6, 2004, before the case was transferred to the
District of Columbia).
21. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 156 (noting that Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004) recognized federal district courts' jurisdiction of habeas petitions filed by Guan-
tanamo Bay detainees and that Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2003) required
all such cases be heard in the District of Columbia); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 11, at 2.
22. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 35; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 2.
23. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 35.
24. Id. at 35-36; Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 4, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
No. 04-702 (U.S. Dec. 2004).
25. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 10, at 3.
26. The Geneva Conventions were promulgated in an effort to codify and regulate
the rules of appropriate military conduct and are the principal instruments of humanita-
rian law. The basic tenets of the conventions are drawn from the seven fundamental
rules of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts. Such customary law is
"widespread, representative and virtually uniform" among parties to the main interna-
tional humanitarian law treaties and include humane treatment for combatants, the
sick, wounded and captured, fundamental judicial guarantees, rules governing means of
warfare, and prohibitions against targeting civilians and torture. See generally Int'l
Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Treaties and Customary International Humanitarian
Law, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/section ihl-treaties and-cus-
tomaryjlaw (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
Generally, the conventions and supplementary protocols draw a distinction between
civilians and combatants, requiring the latter to be clearly distinguishable on the field of
battle. Combatants who fall within the guidelines of the Geneva Conventions enjoy vari-
ous protections, including, but not limited to, humane treatment and immunity from
punishment for most acts committed during fighting. The conventions also provide
grievance procedures, under which human rights violations are addressed. The Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War ("Third Geneva Convention"
or "Convention") deals specifically with the treatment of prisoners of war (POW). It is
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argues that the presidential order establishing the military commissions
violates separation of powers principles (count 4) and invests the commis-
sion with authority exceeding the laws of war (count 7); asserts that the
commission violates the equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment
(count 5) and 42 U.S.C. § 198127 (count 6); and argues that the Military
Order does not apply to him (count 8).28 Petitioner Hamdan does not chal-
lenge the courts-martial or civilian criminal systems; rather, he seeks to
benefit from the preexisting rules governing congressionally authorized
military tribunals and requests direct oversight of his trial by the federal
courts.2 9 Hamdan's petition seeks, inter alia, an order directing his release
from solitary confinement at Guantanamo Bay and preventing his trial
before a military commission.
30
On November 8, 2004, the district court partially granted Hamdan's
petition and denied Respondent Rumsfeld's motion to dismiss. 3 1 Judge
James Robertson of the D.C. District Court granted Hamdan's petition for
habeas corpus to the extent that unless a competent tribunal determined
that he was not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status, he could only be
this convention to which both the district and appeals courts refer in Hamdan's case.
The provisions of the Third Geneva Convention define the types of conflicts covered
(article 3), the definition of POW (article 4), and provide procedures for review of com-
batant status (article 5 and article 102). The remaining articles of the convention deal
more specifically with the rights and duties of "High Contracting Parties" (signatory
nations) and more fully outline the rules governing general protections, captivity, intern-
ment, and treatment of POWs. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm [hereinafter Third Geneva
Convention].
Hamdan's petition essentially asserts that the Third Geneva Convention applies to all
persons detained in Afghanistan during the hostilities there and, as such, he claims that
he qualifies for POW status and the protections accorded therewith, namely immunity
from trial by commission. Under article 3, Hamdan alleges violations of the treatment
required for persons captured during hostilities between High Contracting Par-
ties--article 3 prohibits cruel treatment and torture and forbids "the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court." Third Geneva Convention art. 3, supra. Thus, Hamdan
argues that the military commission is not a sanctioned procedure under either article 3
or article 102 of the convention, and is therefore void. Furthermore, he claims that
where doubt exists as to a detainee's status, article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention
requires that the detaining authority provide an individualized status hearing by a com-
petent tribunal, and until the tribunal makes a determination, he must be regarded as a
POW. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 160-65; see also LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11
UNITED STATES 49-52 (2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/
descriptions/Assessing/AssessingtheNewNormal.pdf (describing the use of parallel sys-
tems of criminal law enforcement and military jurisdiction against suspected terrorists).
Note that Lawyers Committee for Human Rights is now Human Rights First.
27. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2005) provides for "equal rights under the law."
28. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 156. Hamdan essentially argues, in counts 4 and
5, that the Military Order authorizing the creation of military commissions violates con-
stitutional separation of powers principles and violates the Fifth Amendment because it
isolates aliens for adverse treatment.
29. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 37.
30. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 10, at 4.
31. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 2.
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tried by court-martial. 3 2 The district court decided four issues central to
the disposition of Hamdan's habeas petition: (1) whether the court must
abstain from interfering in military proceedings where the jurisdiction of
the military commission is challenged; (2) whether the Third Geneva Con-
vention and attendant protections are judicially enforceable and whether
the petitioner may claim POW protections until a "competent tribunal"
considers and decides his legal status; (3) whether the military commis-
sion procedures are "fatally inconsistent" with the UCMJ and international
and human rights law; and (4) whether Hamdan's pretrial detention was
"unlawful and inhumane. '3 3
Judge Robertson considered three undisputed "facts" central to the
petition: (1) Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan during hostilities follow-
ing September 11, 2001; (2) he claimed POW status under the Third
Geneva Convention; and (3) a competent tribunal did not determine
whether Hamdan is entitled to such status.3 4
In order to proceed, Judge Robertson first had to declare that the "well-
established doctrine that federal courts will 'normally not entertain habeas
petitions by military prisoners unless all available military remedies have
been exhausted"' was not applicable. 3 5 Essentially, Robertson avoids the
"exhaustion principle" 36 by distinguishing prior precedent and finding
that Hamdan's jurisdictional claim denying the right of the military to try
him at all, falls within an exception that "a person need not exhaust reme-
dies in a military tribunal if the military court has no jurisdiction over
him."3 7 As a result, Judge Robertson holds that abstention is not appropri-
ate where a petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of a specially convened
military commission and disputes the lawfulness of the plan to try him for
32. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra
note 11, at 3.
33. See generally Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 157-73.
34. Id. at 156.
35. Id. at 157 (citing Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975), which held that
"when a serviceman charged with crimes by military authorities can show no harm
other than that attendant to the resolution of his case ... the federal district courts must
refrain from intervention"). Judge Robertson states that despite this general principle,
the Councilman court noted that it is "especially unfair to require exhaustion ... when
the complainants' raised substantial arguments denying the right of the military to try
them at all." Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 157. It is within this jurisdictional exception
that Judge Robertson places Hamdan's argument. Id.
36. This principle is also referred to as the abstention principle. In essence, both
terms refer to the notion that the courts should not interfere with pending or com-
menced military proceedings. However, the district court notes that in Parisi v. David-
son, 405 U.S. 34 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that although the rule is often
"framed in terms of 'exhaustion' it may more accurately be understood as based upon
the appropriate demands of comity between two separate judicial systems." Hamdan I,
344 F. Supp. 2d at 157. The district and appeals courts in Hamdan do not find any of
the policy factors supporting the doctrine of comity applicable here. Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld (Hamdan II), 415 F.3d 33, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at
157-58.
37. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 157 (citing New v. Cohen, 129 F.3d. 639 (D.C. Cir.
1997), which created an exception to the general exhaustion rule where the petitioner
raises a jurisdictional argument denying the right of the military to try him).
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alleged war crimes. 38
As to Hamdan's assertions in counts 4 and 7, the district court refuses
to accept the government's assertion that the President has "untrammeled
power to establish military tribunals," 39 and holds that according to
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the President's inherent power in
this realm is quite limited.40 This analysis relies primarily on the Supreme
Court's holdings in Ex Parte Quirin and Application of Yamashita,4 1 which
outlined the scope of presidential power to appoint military commissions.
These cases establish that the "President's authority to prescribe the proce-
dures for military commissions" was conferred by Congress through the
Articles of War (a predecessor to the Uniform Code of Military Justice). 42
Robertson concludes that because Congress exercised its constitutional
power to "define and punish ... [o]ffenses against the Law of Nations"
pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution, Congress
has preserved its traditional jurisdiction over the establishment of military
commissions and that any additional jurisdiction would have to descend
from inherent executive authority.43 On this point Robertson states that
because Congress has acted in this realm, any inherent presidential power
is severely restricted.44
Judge Robertson next considers count 2, which implicates the content
of the "law of war" and the protections afforded to POWs. 4 5 He concludes
that the "law of war includes the Third Geneva Convention, which requires
trial by court-martial as long as Hamdan's POW status is in doubt."46 Rob-
ertson notes that according to the plain language of the Third Geneva Con-
vention, acknowledged to be part of the law of war,47 the Convention
38. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
39. Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 159-60 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), which held that the President's power has three levels: (1) where he acts accord-
ing to his constitutional power and under authorization of Congress, (2) where he acts
according to inherent constitutional power, and (3) where his power is "at its lowest
ebb" where "the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress"); see also Petition for Hearing En Banc, supra note 1, at 5.
41. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), and Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), noting
that the Quirin and Yamashita cases "make it clear that [the UCMJ] represents Congres-
sional approval of the historical, traditional, non-statutory military commission ...
[T]hat approval, however, does not extend past 'offenders or offenses that by statute or
by the law of war may be tried by military commissions"').
42. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
43. Id. at 159.
44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 160-65.
46. Id. at 160.
47. Id. (citing Military Commission Instruction No. 2, § (5)(G) (Apr. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2003/d20030430milcominstno2.
pdf, and 32 C.F.R. § 11.5(g) (2004)). In the United States, the executive may detain and
prosecute those suspected of violent acts, using a limited and specific set of legal tools
such as criminal, civil, and military statutes. The executive's power is further defined by
international law. A number of international human rights treaties--for example, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on
Human Rights--protect the rights of detainees, constraining executive detainment
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applies in "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties. '48 This
language, holds Robertson, thus covers the hostilities in Afghanistan when
Hamdan was captured, since both the United States and Afghanistan have
accepted the Convention. 4 9 He continues that if Hamdan is entitled to
POW protections afforded under the Convention, he cannot be tried by a
military commission because the applicable procedures violate the express
requirements of the Convention.50
Judge Robertson rejects the position that Hamdan is not entitled to the
protections of the Convention or to POW status. On the first point, the
government argues that Hamdan was captured "in the course of a separate
conflict with al Qaeda," rather than in the course of hostilities between
Afghanistan and the United States.5 1 Notwithstanding the fact that this
determination was made pursuant to a presidential "finding," Robertson
refutes this argument, noting that the notion of a "separate" conflict is con-
trary to "public understanding" and "finds no support in the structure of
the Conventions themselves, which are triggered by the place of the con-
flict, and not by what particular faction a fighter is associated with."5 2 He
concludes that at some level, the "Third Geneva Convention applies to all
persons detained in Afghanistan" because the hostilities undoubtedly
implicate the "international human [rights] norms" offered by the
Convention.5 3
Next, Judge Robertson concludes that both the Geneva Conventions
power, and apply even in cases involving terrorism. Moreover, in the context of interna-
tional armed conflict, the United States must abide by international humanitarian law,
otherwise known as the "law of war." The primary instruments of international human-
itarian law are the Geneva Conventions, which the United States has signed and ratified.
Under this system, "every person in enemy hands must have some status under interna-
tional law" and is afforded basic rights and protections. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HuMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 50; see also Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, supra note 26.
48. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 160 (citing article 2 of the Third Geneva
Convention).
49. Id.
50. Id. (noting that article 102 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that "[a]
prisoner of war can be validly sentenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by
the same courts according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power" and that the military commissions do not satisfy such
strictures).
51. Id. at 160.
52. Id. at 160-61 (noting that the presidential finding stated that the Geneva Con-
vention applies to Taliban, but not al Qaeda, detainees captured in Afghanistan and that
the government claimed the finding to be "not reviewable").
53. Id. at 161-63 (drawing a distinction between the full protections offered by
POW status and the limited protections offered under Common Article 3). All four of
the Geneva Conventions share the same article 3, "Common Article 3," which provides
that:
[in the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall
be found to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions .... To this end the
following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
whatsoever ... (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court afford-
Vol. 39
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and applicable Army Regulations 5 4 provide that "whenever a detainee
makes ... a claim [of entitlement to POW status,] his status is 'in doubt" 5 5
and that a detainee "shall enjoy the protection of the Convention until such
time as [his] status has been determined by a competent tribunal. '5 6 Rob-
ertson further holds that Hamdan's review before the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT)5 7 does not address a detainee's status under the
ing all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Id. at 162-63 n.8. Judge Robertson rejects the government's argument that Common
Article 3 does not apply because it was meant to cover local, not international, conflicts,
holding that the provision must apply as a "minimum yardstick... [applicable] to inter-
national conflicts ... [as] 'elementary considerations of humanity."' Id. at 163 (quoting
the International Court of Justice). Robertson goes on to state that the position of the
government limiting the application of the Geneva Convention protections, only
"weaken[s] the United States' own ability to demand application of the Geneva Conven-
tions to Americans captured during armed conflicts abroad." Id. at 163; see also Brief
for General David M. Brahms et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellee at 3,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393) (stating that
[tihe United States ratified the Geneva Conventions to protect Americans cap-
tured in armed conflict. For more than 50 years, the United States has insisted
on a broad, generous interpretation of the Conventions to assure the welfare of
captured U.S. troops. If Appellants are permitted to deny the detainees the Con-
ventions' protections, tyrants will hide their oppression under U.S. precedent
and our servicemen and women will pay with their lives).
The position of the government in this case is starkly different from the position and
behavior of the United States in previous conflicts and will only weaken its ability to
demand application of the Geneva Conventions. The Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights (now Human Rights First) has noted that the erosion of human rights protections
in the United States following September 11 has had a profound effect on human rights
standards around the world. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 73.
The United States' selective enforcement of international human rights treaties to which
it is bound has caused other governments to disregard domestic and international laws
governing human rights. Id. Prior to September 11, the United States was a leader in
promoting the development of international human rights law and often took the lead in
enforcing such standards. However, the development and implementation of aggressive
counterterrorism laws have undermined established norms of due process and threaten
detainees' access to counsel and judicial review. Id. at 75-76 (including a lengthy dis-
cussion of various opportunistic governments around the world which have co-opted the
U.S. "war on terror" as an endorsement of their own longstanding practices that violate
human rights).
54. Hamdan claims that Army Regulation 190-8, § 1-6(a) applies to his case and
requires that "whenever a detainee makes [ I a claim [that he is entitled to POW status]
his status is in 'doubt."' Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 162. Army Regulation 190-8
establishes "policies and planning guidance for the treatment, care, accountability, legal
status, and administrative procedures for Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees,
Retained Personnel, and Other Detainees." Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of
War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees, at i (Oct. 1, 1997),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-8.pdf. The regulation
expressly incorporates domestic and international laws and treaties, including the
Geneva Conventions, to regulate the treatment of detainees. Id. at 1.
55. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
56. Id. at 161 (quoting article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention).
57. CSRTs were instituted pursuant to a July 7, 2004 Department of Defense order.
According to this order, the CSRT applies only to foreign nationals under the control of
the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay and provides the detainees an "opportu-
nity to contest designation as an enemy combatant .. . [and] to consult with and be
assisted by a personal representative ... and [ ] the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus
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Geneva Conventions and that the CSRT is not a "competent tribunal. 58
Additionally, Robertson rejects the government's position that the Presi-
dent's decision to withhold POW status for members of al Qaeda is bind-
ing, declaring that the President may not be considered a "competent
tribunal" and that Hamdan must be accorded the full protections of a POW
until a specific status determination has been made.5 9
In response to the government's claim that even if Hamdan has rights
under the Third Geneva Convention, they are not judicially enforceable, 60
Judge Robertson concludes that the Convention is "self-executing."'6 1 Trea-
ties are "non-self-executing" when they do not become effective as domestic
law without implementing legislation. 62 By considering the "intent of the
signatory parties as manifested by the language of the treaty" and the legis-
in the courts of the United States." The CSRT consists of three commissioned officers of
the U.S. Armed Forces. If the Tribunal determines that the detainee should no longer be
classified as an enemy combatant, the detainee is released to his country of citizenship.
See generally Memorandum from Department of Defense Deputy Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz to the Secretary of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunals (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
58. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 162.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 163-64 (recognizing the government's argument that the Convention is
"non-self-executing" and that Hamdan has failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted because the Convention does not give rise to a private cause of action, but
holding that "as an initial matter ... Hamdan has not asserted a 'private right of action'"
and that the "Convention is implicated ... by operation of the statute [10 U.S.C.A.
§ 821] that limits trials by military tribunal to 'offenders . . . triable under the law of
war"'). See also Brief for General David M. Brahms et al., supra note 53, at 15, noting
that
Hamdan has not asserted a private right of action under the GPW [Third
Geneva Convention]. Rather, he has sought federal habeas relief on the ground
that he has been held in "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States." Thus, even if the Conventions are deemed not to
be self-executing, 'the non-self-executing nature of a treaty is not fatal to an
assertion of jurisdiction under it, provided that the cause of action over which
jurisdiction is asserted already exists in some other statute--as is the case for
habeas petitions.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
61. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (stating that U.S. courts are bound to give
effect to international law and to international agreements of the United States unless
such agreements are non-self-executing).
62. Id. Robertson states that a treaty is "non-self-executing if it manifests an inten-
tion that it not become effective as domestic law without enactment of implementing
legislation; or if the Senate in consenting to the treaty requires implementing legislation;
or if implementing legislation is constitutionally required." Id. at 164. The controlling
law on the subject of whether or not treaties are self-executing is Diggs v. Richardson, 555
F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1976) which instructs a court interpreting a treaty to "look to the
intent of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the treaty and, if the
language is uncertain, then to look to the circumstances surrounding execution of the
treaty." Hamdan I, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 164. Under this precedent, Judge Robertson
concludes that "it is quite clear from the legislative history of the ratification of the
Geneva Conventions that Congress carefully considered what further legislation, if any,
was deemed 'required to give effect to the provisions contained in the four conventions,'
[ I and found that only four provisions required implementing legislation." Id. (internal
citation omitted).
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lative history, Robertson concludes that only four provisions of the Third
Geneva Convention require implementing legislation and that none of
these apply to Hamdan's case.6 3 As a result, Hamdan may not be tried for
war crimes except by a duly convened court-martial.
Judge Robertson abstains from considering Hamdan's rights under
Common Article 3 (count 3)64 because the requirement of "trial before a
'regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples' has no fixed, term of art
meaning" and "[o]nly Hamdan's right to be present at every phase of his
trial ... is of immediate pretrial concern."6 5 Accordingly, Robertson holds
that because the military commission procedures allow Hamdan to be
excluded from portions of the trial and deny confrontation rights, they are
inconsistent with the requirements of the UCMJ and are thus void. 66
Although noting that the procedures represent a "dramatic deviation from
the confrontation clause [and] could not be countenanced in any American
court" and the right to be present at one's own trial is "established as a
matter of international humanitarian and human rights law,"' 67 Robertson
does not reach the issue of whether Hamdan may rely on constitutional
notions of fairness. Instead, he finds the procedures unlawful because they
are inconsistent with the UCMJ and because the government's argument
for procedural "flexibility" in military commission proceedings has no sup-
63. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 164. Robertson notes that while articles 129 and
130, providing for additional criminal penalties imposed on "those who engaged in
'grave' violations of the Conventions, such as torture ... [or] medical experiments,"
required additional implementing legislation, articles 5 and 102, which are dispositive in
Hamdan's case, do not:
[b]ecause the Geneva Conventions were written to protect individuals, because
the Executive Branch of our government has implemented the Geneva Conven-
tions for fifty years without questioning the absence of implementing legislation,
because Congress clearly understood that the Conventions did not require
implementing legislation except in a few specific areas, and because nothing in
the Third Geneva Convention itself manifests the contracting parties' intention
that it not become effective as domestic law without the enactment of imple-
menting legislation, I conclude that, insofar as it is pertinent here, the Third
Geneva Convention is a self-executing treaty.
Id. at 164-65.
64. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 165-66.
66. Id. at 166-68. Robertson's voiding of the military commission procedures does
not go so far as to declare final review by the President "inconsistent with" the UCMJ.
67. Id. at 168. Judge Robertson notes that the problem with the commission rules is
neither "remote nor speculative" as the government has already admitted that for two
days of the trial Hamdan will be excluded from the proceedings. Id. at 171. He also
states that a provision that excludes the "accused from his trial for reasons other than
his disruptive behavior or his voluntary absence is indeed directly contrary to the ...
right to be present." Id. at 172. On this basis, Robertson holds that the military com-
mission cannot try Hamdan. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-5393) (noting that the commission
rules permit Hamdan to be excluded from portions of the trial and that "[t]hese actions
violate the longstanding guarantee of confrontation, one 'founded on natural justice"').
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port in the evidence.68
Finally, Judge Robertson holds that Hamdan's claim of inhumane pre-
trial detention (count 2) is moot because two days before oral argument,
Hamdan was moved back to the general detainee population at Guanta-
namo Bay. 69 Robertson also states that Hamdan's speedy trial (count 1)
and equal protection claims (count 5) need not be ruled upon.70 He then
grants Hamdan's petition for habeas corpus in part and orders:
(1) that, unless and until.a competent tribunal determines that Hamdan is
not entitled to POW status, he may be tried for the offenses with which he is
charged only by court-martial under the [UCMJ]; (2) that, unless and until
the Military Commission's rule permitting Hamdan's exclusion . . . is
amended so that it is consistent with and not contrary to [the] UCMJ ...
Hamdan's trial before the Military Commission would be unlawful; and (3)
that Hamdan must be released from the pre-Commission detention wing []
and returned to the general population of detainees .... 71
In so holding, Judge Robertson invokes several provisions of the UCMJ and
the Third Geneva Convention to enjoin the military commission proceed-
ings against Hamdan. 7 2
In response to Judge Robertson's order granting Hamdan's habeas
petition and invalidating the military commissions, on November 16,
2004, Respondent Rumsfeld filed a notice of appeal. 73 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district
court onJuly 15, 2005 in an opinion written by Judge Randolph and joined
by Judge Roberts (in full) and Judge Williams (in part).7 4 The appellate
court agrees with the district court that the petitioner's claims fall within
68. Hamdan I, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69. Robertson states that the government has
failed to make an adequate showing of "need" which would justify excluding Hamdan
from trial. Id. at 170. Such "need" is often demonstrated by military exigencies, includ-
ing the obligation to protect confidential information. Id. at 171.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id. at 172-73. Robertson states that until a few days before oral argument,
Hamdan's most urgent claims were: (1) that he had been unlawfully and inhumanely
detained in isolation since December 2003; and (2) that he was entitled to the protec-
tions of the UCMJ's speedy trial rule and that he had been detained for more than the
maximum 90 days permitted by article 103 of the Third Geneva Convention. Id. at 172.
On the first claim, Robertson acknowledges that on the Friday afternoon before the oral
argument held on Monday, October 25, 2004, Hamdan was moved back to Camp Delta.
He further notes that while the change in status "may not exactly moot Hamdan's claim
about his confinement in isolation," a concern with Hamdan's treatment in the future is
"not susceptible to review on a writ of habeas corpus." Id. On the second claim, Robert-
son states that the speedy trial concerns were more urgent before Hamdan's transfer out
of Camp Echo, and, moreover, by virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), he may be detained for the duration of the hostilities and
that the UCMJ speedy trial rule does not specify a number of days that will require
dismissal of a suit. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 172-73.
71. Hamdan 1, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 173. Based on part three of his order, it appears
that Judge Robertson considered Hamdan's removal from isolation in Camp Echo to the
pre-Commission detention wing of Camp Delta insufficient and required the govern-
ment to place Hamdan in the general population of detainees at Camp Delta.
72. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 24, at 17-21.
73. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan II), 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
74. Id.
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an exception to the abstention doctrine, 75 but holds that, through the
AUMF, Congress authorized presidential creation of military commis-
sions,76 that the Third Geneva Convention is not judicially enforceable, 77
and that to the extent "there [is] ambiguity about the meaning" and applica-
bility of the Convention, the President's view prevails. 78
On appeal the court considers (1) whether the district court erred in
refusing to abstain from considering Hamdan's claims; (2) whether the
President may unilaterally to create military commissions; (3) whether the
Third Geneva Convention confers a right to judicial enforcement; (4)
whether the Third Geneva Convention applies to members of al Qaeda; (5)
whether the district court erred in declaring that the military commission
procedures must be coextensive with the procedures contained in the
UCMJ; and (6) whether the district court erred in holding that, until a
competent tribunal determines that Hamdan is not a POW, he may only be
tried by court-martial. 79
The appellate court begins by rejecting the government's argument
that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over Hamdan's
habeas petition.80 In agreement with Judge Robertson's holding, the court
simply states that because Hamdan "contend[s] that a military commission
has no jurisdiction over him. .. [h]is claim ... falls within the exception to
Councilman .... "81
Next, the court quickly dismisses Hamdan's argument that the Presi-
dent violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers when he
established the military commissions by ruling that the President's Novem-
75. Id. at 36-37.
76. Id. at 38; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 4.
77. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 40.
78. Id. at 42. Arguably, the appellate court condones the violation of traditional
international law obligations, such as the minimum due process and human rights stan-
dards contained within various international treaties including the International Cove-
nant of Civil and Political Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the
Third Geneva Conventions. The United States, as a signatory, is legally bound to meet
the requirements and standards included therein. The military commission process at
issue in this case does not satisfy the various international legal standards and should
be declared void. See generally Amicus Curiae Brief of 422 Current and Former Mem-
bers of the United Kingdom and European Union Parliamentarians in Support of Peti-
tioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2006) (arguing that international
law is a part of the law of the United States, that respect for international law reflects the
United States' tradition and serves U.S. interests, and that international law applies to
detainees at Guantanamo Bay in order to preserve fundamental human rights). See also
Brief for General David M. Brahms et al., supra note 53, at 3, stating
[flor more than 50 years, the United States has insisted on a broad, generous
interpretation of the Conventions to assure the welfare of captured U.S. troops.
If Appellants are permitted to deny the detainees the Conventions' protections,
tyrants will hide their oppression under U.S. precedent and our servicemen and
women will pay with their lives.
Id.
79. Petition for Hearing En Banc, supra note 1, at 1-2; see Hamdan II, 415 F.3d 33.
80. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 36-37.
81. Id. at 37; see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. The Councilman
exception to the exhaustion principle applies when the petitioner raises a jurisdictional
argument denying the right of the military to try him.
469
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ber 13, 2001 Military Order was authorized by Congress.8 2 The court ini-
tially expresses doubt as to whether "someone in Hamdan's position is
entitled to assert such a constitutional claim,"8 3 but holds that regardless
of the petitioner's status, there is little merit to the claim.8 4 When the Pres-
ident issued the Military Order subjecting members of al Qaeda to trial by
military commission, he relied on "four sources of authority: his authority
as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces[;] ... [the AUMF;] 10 U.S.C.
§ 821; and 10 U.S.C. § 836."'85 Because the last three sources of authority
are acts of Congress, the court finds it "impossible to see any basis for
Hamdan's claim that Congress has not authorized military commis-
sions."86 As a result of this finding, the court notes that it need not
address the question of whether the President has unilateral power to cre-
ate the commissions.8 7
The court next overturns the decision of the district court that the
Third Geneva Convention may be judicially enforced.8 8 The court states
that while the Constitution proclaims that treaties "shall be the supreme
Law of the Land," the United States "has traditionally negotiated treaties
with the understanding that they do not create judicially enforceable indi-
vidual rights."8 9 Rather, the court characterizes treaties as a "compact
between independent nations" where enforcement is achieved according to
the "interest and honor of the governments which are parties to it."90 The
court asserts that the district court decision "disregards the principles" of
treaty enforcement and "is contrary to the Convention itself."9 1 The
court's interpretation of the holdings in Johnson v. Eisentrager and Holmes
82. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 37-38.
83. Id. at 37 (noting that because Hamdan is not a U.S. citizen, he may lack standing
to allege a claim based on a constitutional right or protection and citing People's
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) and 32 County
Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002) in support of the
proposition that Hamdan, as an enemy combatant, is denied such rights because "aliens
receive constitutional protections [only] when they have come within the territory of the
United States and developed substantial connections with this country").
84. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 37. Hamdan's argument is that "Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution gives Congress the power to 'constitute tribunals inferior to the
Supreme Court,' that Congress has not established military commissions, and that the
President has no inherent authority to do so under Article II." Id. (citing Neal K. Katyal
& Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE
LJ. 1259, 1284-85 (2002)).
85. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 37; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
86. Id. at 38.
87. The district court explicitly held that the President acted without congressional
authorization, finding that Congress intended to preserve its "traditional jurisdiction
over enemy combatants." Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159
(D.D.C. 2004) (quoting from In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946)); see also supra note
40 and accompanying text. By reaching this conclusion, the district court had to
address the question of whether inherent constitutional presidential power provided the
authority to create military commissions, a problem of constitutional interpretation the
appellate court avoided by finding congressional authorization for the commissions.
88. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 38-40.
89. Id. at 38 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
90. Id. at 38.
91. Id. at 39.
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v. Laird9 2 provides support for this position and allows the court to con-
clude that the Third Geneva Convention "does not confer upon Hamdan a
right to enforce its provisions in court."9 3
The court additionally holds that even if the Third Geneva Convention
is judicially enforceable, Hamdan is still not eligible for its protections.9 4
Hamdan contends that trial by military commission violates his rights
under the Convention, which provides that a "[POWI can be validly sen-
tenced only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts
according to the same procedure as in the case of members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power."95 However, the court holds that Hamdan
does not fit the definition of a POW,96 identifying two problems which
preclude Hamdan's claim to these protections.
First, the court concludes that because Hamdan "does not purport to
be a member of a group who displayed 'a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance' and who conducted 'their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war,"' he does not fall within the definition of a POW
outlined by the Third Geneva Convention.9 7 Second, the court holds that
the Convention does not apply to members of al Qaeda.98 According to the
appeals court, the Convention contemplates only two types of armed con-
flicts: an international conflict between two or more signatory nations, and
civil war occurring within the territory of a signatory nation. 99 The first
type does not apply to the facts of the case, says the court, because al
Qaeda is neither a state nor a "High Contracting Party." 10 0 As to the provi-
sion concerning civil war, the appeals court acknowledges that Afghani-
92. Id. at 39-40 (noting that Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) held that
the Convention was not judicially enforceable and that while the Convention specifies
rights of POWs, responsibility for enforcement is placed in military and political author-
ities, thus implicating the need for implementing legislation; further noting that Holmes
v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972) applied the Eisentrager holding to deny judicial
enforcement of another international treaty, the NATO Status of Forces Agreement).
93. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 40. The court also stated that the Supreme Court's
decision in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) did not render the Geneva Convention
judicially enforceable merely because the federal district courts were given jurisdiction
over habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of Guantanamo detainees: "[t]hat a court
has jurisdiction over a claim does not mean the claim is valid .... The availability of
habeas may obviate a petitioner's need to rely on a private right of action, but it does not
render a treaty judicially enforceable." Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 39-40 (internal citations
omitted).
94. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 40.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. (citing the Third Geneva Convention, supra note 26, arts. 4A(2)(b), (c) &
(d)).
98. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 41.
99. Id. (citing JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO ThE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960) which notes that Common Article 3 applies
only to armed conflicts that "take place within the confines of a single country"). The
appellate court goes on to note that President Bush determined that the armed conflict
with al Qaeda was "international in scope," and overturns the district court's determina-
tion that the United States was not engaged in a separate conflict with al Qaeda distinct
from its conflict with the Taliban. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 41-42.
100. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 41.
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stan is a "High Contracting Party" and that Hamdan was captured during
hostilities there. Nonetheless, it affirms the President's determination that
the United States is engaged in a separate conflict with al Qaeda and that
consequently, the Third Geneva Convention does not apply. 10 1 In so hold-
ing, the appellate court expressly overturns the district court's ruling on
this matter, noting that
the President 'has a degree of independent authority to act' in foreign affairs
[.. T]he President's decision to treat our conflict with the Taliban sepa-
rately from our conflict with al Qaeda is the sort of political-military deci-
sion constitutionally committed to him .... [T]he President's reasonable
view . must therefore prevail.' 0 2
The court extends this deferential posture by holding that even if
Geneva Convention protections covered members of al Qaeda, the court
would abstain from testing the procedures of the military commission. 10 3
The court bases this ruling on the principle of comity- -although Hamdan
argues that the military lacks jurisdiction, his demand for Geneva Conven-
tion protections goes to how, and not whether, the commission may try
him. 10 4 Hamdan's claim, structured in this manner, falls outside the
exception to the Councilman doctrine' 0 5 and requires that the court defer
to the military proceedings. 10 6
The court then holds, based on a close reading of the plain language of
the UCMJ, that the district court's interpretation, requiring the military
commissions to comply in all respects with the provisions pertaining to
courts-martial, was erroneous. 10 7 Noting that the UCMJ consistently dis-
tinguishes between courts-martial and military commissions, the court
states that the interpretation of the district court eliminates the meaningful
distinction between the terms. ' 0 8 The more reasonable reading, argues the
court, is that in establishing the tribunals, the "President may not adopt
procedures [ . . contrary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ's provisions
governing military commissions."' 0 9 Therefore, because the right to be
present at all stages of the trial is assured pursuant to an UCMJ rule gov-
erning only courts-martial, Hamdan's trial by military commission is not
101. Id. at 41-42.
102. Id. at 42. Judge Robertson expressly stated that the conflict with al Qaeda was
inseparable from the conflict in Afghanistan and that the protections of the Geneva Con-
vention were triggered by the location of the conflict rather than by the combatant's
affiliation. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004).
103. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 42.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
106. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 42.
107. Id. at 42-43.
108. Id. at 42.
109. Id. at 43; see also Reply Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 26, Hamdan v. Rum-
sfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 15, 2005) (No. 04-5393) (stating that if the UCMJ is
read to require military commissions to comply with all UCMJ rules, which by their
terms apply only to courts-martial, "the language in other UCMJ provisions extending a
particular rule to military commissions would be superfluous").
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invalidated if it lacks this procedural protection. 1 10 The court expressly
rejects the district court's holding that the military commission procedures
are illegal because they are "fatally contrary to or inconsistent" with the
UCMJ, 1n and authorizes broad presidential power to create and convene
military tribunals, stating that the UCMJ imposes only "minimal restric-
tions upon the form and function of military commissions."' 12
Finally, the court rejects Hamdan's argument, 1 13 and the district
court's finding, that he is entitled to POW protections under the Third
Geneva Convention until "some other legal status is determined by [a]
competent authority."1 14 Because the President found that Hamdan was
not a POW under the Convention, and because "nothing in the regulations,
and nothing Hamdan argues, suggests that the President is not a 'compe-
tent authority,"' Hamdan's legal status has been sufficiently deter-
mined.' 15 Furthermore, the court holds that the military commission may
satisfy Hamdan's demand that a "competent tribunal" determine his sta-
tus. 1 1 6 According to army regulations, a "competent tribunal" must be
composed of three commissioned officers; because the military tribunal to
try Hamdan is composed of three colonels, the court "see[s] no reason why
Hamdan could not assert his claim to [POW] status before the military
commission at the time of his trial and thereby receive the judgment of a
'competent tribunal' . . . .,117
Judge Williams' brief concurring opinion affirms all aspects of the
majority opinion, "except for the conclusion that Common Article 3 does
not apply to the United States' conduct toward al Qaeda personnel cap-
tured in the conflict in Afghanistan."' 18 Judge Williams fully endorses the
court's judgment, however, because he agrees with the court's holding that
the Third Geneva Convention is not judicially enforceable and that any
claims under Common Article 3 are precluded until military proceedings
against Hamdan are concluded. 1 9 He argues only that Common Article 3
"fills the gap" between those Convention protections extended to signatory
powers and those withheld from non-signatory nations; thus, he asserts,
the words "'not of an international character' are sensibly understood to
110. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 43.
111. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (Hamdan 1), 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 166 (D.D.C. 2004).
112. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 43.
113. Id. at 43.
114. Id. Hamdan argues that even if the Geneva Convention is not judicially enforcea-
ble, Army Regulation 190-8, supra note 54, provides relief because it requires that pris-
oners receive the protections of the Convention until their legal status is determined by a
"competent authority."
115. Id. Essentially, the court agrees with the government that the President, acting
pursuant to congressional authorization, has the power to unilaterally determine the
legal status of an enemy combatant such as Hamdan.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 44 (Williams, J., concurring); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text
(summarizing Judge Robertson's analysis of the applicability of Common Article 3).
119. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 44.
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refer to a conflict between a signatory nation and a non-state actor."'120
The language and structure of Common Article 3, therefore, encompass the
conflict between al Qaeda (a non-state actor) and the United States (a sig-
natory nation).
By holding that (1) Congress authorized the creation and implementa-
tion of the military commission that was to try Hamdan, (2) the Third
Geneva Convention is not judicially enforceable, (3) the President's view of
the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention to members of al Qaeda
prevailed, and (4) Hamdan could only contest the judgment of the commis-
sion in federal court after he exhausted his military remedies,1 21 the appel-
late court broadly defined presidential power to detain and try enemy
combatants and completely disagreed with the district court on the same
questions of law and fact.
As is clear from the foregoing summary of the district and appellate
courts' opinions, this case implicates serious issues concerning the powers
of the President in time of military conflict, the proper role of the three
branches of government, the meaning and impact of international treaties
and laws, and the availability of review for judgments and punishments
meted out by military tribunals. 1 22 In resolving these issues in favor of the
government, the Court of Appeals wholly endorsed the use of military
commissions as a lawful means of prosecuting and punishing alien detain-
ees. The appeals decision supported full presidential power to create, con-
vene, and structure military tribunals, unbound by the traditional
strictures of longstanding constitutional, international, and statutory
law.123 The ruling completely forecloses Third Geneva Convention and
Army Regulation protections and will require terrorism cases to be tried by
commission, with procedures limited only by "minimal restrictions."1 2 4
The impact of the appellate court's holding on the ability of Guantanamo
detainees to obtain meaningful review is likely to be significant, consider-
120. Id. (citing the text of Common Article 3, which provides minimal protection for
non-state parties in "an armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties").
121. See generally Hamdan II, 415 F.3d 33.
122. See generally Petition for Hearing En Banc, supra note 1.
123. The military commissions created to try detainees held at Guantanamo Bay
operate outside the substantive and procedural rules applicable in U.S. criminal courts
or U.S. courts-martial and outside international law governing the detention of POWs
under the Geneva Conventions. This extra-legal measure seems to place the decision of
whether a detainee is to be held indefinitely or tried by military commission "entirely
within the discretion of the executive branch." LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 26, at 49-52.
124. Hamdan II, 415 F.3d at 43; see also Reply Brief of Petitioner to Government's
Opposition to Certiorari app. C at 11a, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (U.S. Sept. 12, 2005) (No.
05-184) (a brief filed in another case to address the effects of the Hamdan 'decision).
Moreover, the government's efforts to address the threat posed by al Qaeda have pro-
duced a complex situation. By using military jurisdiction to preclude constitutional due
process and applying criminal labels to enemy combatants to sidestep international law
protections, the executive's approach, which demands an "unprecedented level of defer-
ence" from the courts, has transformed the "bedrock principles of the rule of law ...
into little more than tactical options." LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26,
at 49.
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ing the large number of detainees held at Guantanamo, but the breadth of
this impact remains to be seen.
125
125. The United States Supreme Court granted Hamdan's petition for certiorari on
November 7, 2005. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 622 (2005). The Court will be faced with the questions of the proper scope of
presidential power to create and regulate military commissions, the content of the law of
war, and the legal rights of alien combatants.

